The UK Health and Safety Executive in collaboration with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (US Department of Transport) have carried out a detailed review of very large vapour cloud explosions associated with pipeline failures and losses of containment at refineries as well as LPG, LNG and gasoline storage sites. In the first instance this work is intended to inform assessment of the potential for escalation at LNG sites, in the case of an explosion following a significant leak of refrigerant gases (e.g .propane and iso-butane), but the findings are relevant to a wide range of petrochemical sites.
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The review has focussed on two areas:
1.
The relationship between weather conditions, source term and development of the flammable cloud.
Surprisingly we have found that a majority of very large vapour cloud incidents occurred in nil wind conditions. Rather than being catastrophic failures of large pipes or vessels, many of the most serious vapour cloud incidents were relatively small but sustained leaks, where vapour accumulated near the source and built up a substantial cloud over tens of minutes. In nil wind conditions, the cloud spreads through the action of gravity and the flammable zone reached more than 500m from the source in several of the incidents. The frequency of these events in the incident record suggests that small leaks in nil wind may be more likely than catastrophic failures that produce a significant vapour cloud in any weather conditions.
Consequences of explosion in clouds with higher reactivity than methane
Examination of primary data from a number of LPG and gasoline incident investigations showed that in many cases severe overpressure effects extended to a high proportion of the cloud -and the damage was not confined to areas where there was congested pipework or vegetation. In fact, we have not identified any reports of very large premixed clouds of gasoline vapour (with radius in excess of 200 m) which have burned slowly as flash fires. Notwithstanding the lack of pressure effects, such flash fires could cause deaths or injuries and would certainly have left a huge burned area. It seems likely that such occurrences would be reported in many parts of the world. The lack of such reports suggests that if a very large gasoline cloud develops in a normal industrial context, the probability of a severe explosion is high. The situation for LPG is less clear cut: a significant proportion of large clouds caused by pipeline failures have burned as flash fires. The majority of these flash fires occurred in zero wind conditions and were probably very rich.
The paper reviews the damage caused by test detonations on a range of common objects including overpressure sensitive objects like drums and boxes and drag sensitive columnar objects like scaffold poles and fence posts. The latter types of object exhibit a very characteristic distribution of plastic strain along the column length, resulting continuous curvature rather than strain concentrated in plastic hinges.
Previously unpublished data from the Flixborough explosion are presented. The vapour cloud (extending up to 180 m from the plant) included many continuously curved poles and posts that matched the detonation test results. There is strong evidence that a large part of the cloud in this incident detonated.
The paper also presents data from the VCE at San Juan, Puerto Rico (2009). High quality photographic records and CCTV images allow the progress of this VCE to be reconstructed. The location in which transition to a severe explosion occurred is of particular interest in guiding risk assessment at other sites. The site of San Juan explosion was also rich in lightweight columnar objects but no examples of continuous curvature were recorded. Other large VCEs at Buncefield (2005) and Jaipur (2009) show similar characteristics. It seems unlikely that these incidents were detonations. Video records of the speed of flame spread at San Juan support this conclusion.
The regular occurrence of severe explosions extending to the whole cloud has been recognised in the years since Buncefield. There has been a general presumption that this means that all such incidents were detonations, since this is the only mechanism for sustaining explosions in fairly open areas that has been demonstrated experimentally. There is now very strong evidence that there must be at least one other mechanism by which severe explosions in very large clouds can progress in open areas. The gap in scale between experiments and real clouds is very large; there was always a chance that important large-scale phenomena might have been missed. The paper examines one potential explanation for the observed behaviour that involves thermal radiation warming pre-mixed gas clouds ahead of the advancing flame front during a VCE. The analysis suggests that radiation effects may be the key to understanding the explosion mechanism in many incidents.
The paper concludes with a discussion of how the new data on vapour cloud explosions that has become available over the last ten years may affect regulatory policy in the future.
